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Abstract—SDN provides a programmable command and control
networking system in a multi-tenant cloud network using control
and data plane separation. However, separating the control and
data planes make it difficult for incorporating some security
services (e.g., firewalls) into SDN framework. Most of the existing
solutions use SDN switches as packet filters and rely on SDN
controllers to implement firewall policy management functions,
which is impractical for implementing stateful firewalls since
SDN switches only send session’s initial packets and statistical
data of flows to their controllers. For a data center networking
environment, applying a Distributed FireWall (DFW) system to
prevent attacker’s lateral movements is highly desired, in which
designing and implementing an SDN-based Stateful DFW (SDFW)
demand a scalable distributed states management solution at the
data plane to track packets and flow states. Our performance
results show that SDFW achieves scalable security against data
plane attacks with a marginal performance hit ∼ 1.6% reduction
in network bandwidth.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networking (SDN), Distributed
Firewall (DFW), Connection Tracking
I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [1] simplifies networking
management by decoupling control plane and data plane. The
SDN controller can dynamically configure multiple physical or
virtual network switches. The lack of built-in security in the
SDN limits its adoption, as reported some campus adopters [2].
Although the centralized design is an import characteristic of
SDN framework, it can introduce security challenges such as
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, targeted at SDN controller and
OpenFlow switches [3]. An important role of DFW is the
prevention of lateral movement of an attacker as described in
microsegmentation framework [4], which is not implemented
by current SDN firewalls. In particular, this research focuses
on the following two research issues
SDN-based Firewall Issues: There are two main issues we
identified in current SDN-based firewall architecture. 1) Most
of the existing firewall architectures such as Flowguard [5],
FortNOX [6], [7], [8] are centralized in nature. In a large cloud
network, SDN controller performance can become extremely
slow in the centralized architecture. 2) There is no support
for packet state maintenance and multi-tenancy in most of
these works, as noted by Dixit et al [9]. In the absence of
state information, it is difficult to discover attacks originating
in SDN-data plane [10]. Thus, a stateful firewall is neces-
sary to provide a granular security in SDN-environment. The
challenge, however, with a centralized stateful firewall, is that
controller receives a large volume of state-based traffic, which
can become a performance bottleneck. So we need a distributed
stateful-firewall (SDFW) to provision granular security in a
scalable fashion. Using an SDFW architecture, the distributed
firewall can be easily managed in a cloud network.
With these security challenges and design goals, discussed
above in mind, and realizing the need for an automated-
security management framework, we designed SDFW. The key
contribution of this research work are as follows:
• The SDFW firewall in our framework is utilized to
construct OpenFlow rules, which are implemented on
the switches using a stateful distributed firewall (SDFW)
framework. Using the SDFW scales well on a large net-
work with limited performance impact ∼ 1.6% reduction
in network bandwidth.
• SDFW identifies the lateral movement of the attacker
and implements SDN based security countermeasures to
prevent the attack propagation in a multi-tenant cloud
network.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. SDN and OpenFlow
OpenFlow
Channel
Group
Table
Flow
Table 0
Packet In Packet Out
Action 
Set = {}
Ingress 
Port
Action 
Set
Packet + 
Ingress port 
+ metadata Execute 
Action Set
Flow
Table N Action 
Set
Packet
Switch 
Port
MAC 
src
MAC 
dst
Eth
type
IP
src
IP
dst
TCP
sport
TCP
dport
Action
port3
00:2e:.
.
00:4f:.. 0x800 1.2.3.4 1.2.3.1 3080 80 port3OpenFlow
Rules
port6 * * * * 1.2.3.1 * 21 drop
Southbound Interface (OpenFlow/SSL)
OpenFlow Switch
Statistics
400
24
Application Plane
Control Plane
Northbound APIs
Load Balancing
L2/L3 Module DHCP Module
Topology
Discovery
Application 
Firewall
Policy/ QoS 
Enforcement
Flow Optimizer
Netconf, OVSDB
Fig. 1. OpenFlow Rule Format
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OpenFlow is one of the most popular protocols, which allows
the incorporation of SDN capabilities in the cloud network.
OpenFlow switches consist of flow tables, which run at line rate
to allow traffic between data plane devices. Figure 1 illustrates
different planes of SDN, and how SDN controller can insert
flow rules into flow tables.
Definition II.1. OpenFlow Rule: A flow table F of an Open-
Flow switch, can have rules, {r1, r2, .., rn} Each rule consists
of layer 2-4 packet header fields, protocol (TCP/UDP/FTP),
action-set associated with the rule, rule priority, and statistics.
We define the flow rule using tuple ri = (pi, ρi, hi, ai, si),
where a) pi denotes rule priority, b) ρi denotes the protocol of
the incoming traffic (TCP/UDP) c) hi depicts the packet header,
d) ai is the action associated with the rule, e) si represents the
statistics associated with the rule.
The flow rule header space hi, consists of physical port of
incoming traffic δi, source and destination hardware address,
i.e., αsi, αdi, source and destination IP address, βsi, βdi, source
and destination port address, γsi, γdi. Packet header can be
defined by the tuple hi = (δi, αsi, αdi, βsi, βdi, γsi, γdi). Rule
statistics si, comprises of both flow duration and number of
packets/bytes for each flow rule si = (di, bi).
The flow rules, generally presented in the Figure 1 can be
used to block traffic from a network segment, using SDN
based centralized firewall architecture [9]. However, the attacks
originating in data-plane which rely on connection information,
go undetected using the centralized firewall architecture.
B. Need for Stateful-Distributed Firewall
Firewall: is a collection of components, interposed between
two networks, that filters the traffic between them according to
some security policy. If we consider the modern data-centers
as a use-case, the scope of security enforcement offered by a
traditional firewall is limited to north-south traffic, i.e., firewall
serves as a sentry between trusted and untrusted networks.
Once the attacker has managed to breach the security restric-
tions at the network edge, he can laterally move inside the
network (east-west traffic), exploiting key resources, virtually
unchecked. The volume of east-west traffic in the data center
environment is around 76%, as compared to north-south traffic
- 17% [11].
Stateful Firewall: is responsible for packet filtering by
tracking the state of network connections. The TCP connections
have three major states, connection establishment, usage, and
termination. The firewall normally utilizes a state-table to track
the bidirectional connection between hosts and blocks the
packets that deviate from expected state [12]. The application
firewall that performs fine-grained analysis such as stateful
protocol analysis and deep-packet-inspection (DPI), has not
been considered in SDFW framework in its current version.
Scenario 1: Stateless-centralized Firewall Figure 2, shows
three OpenFlow switches connected to centralized SDN con-
troller, with Firewall functionality. The traffic between certain
VMs across the networks has been allowed, using OpenFlow
rules shown in the flow table. Suppose if there is a security
(1) Discover and exploit Web1 vulnerability 
(2) Compromise DB1 – SQLI  (3) Exploit DB2 
(4) Centralized State-Monitoring 
Fig. 2. Security Issues in a centralized firewall
vulnerability on Web1, DB1, and, DB2, and the attacker is
located on VM1. Although the network traffic is allowed
between VM1-Web1, the stateless firewall cannot inspect the
state of the network connection. Using a stateless firewall alone,
the connection information used by an attacker to mount a
multi-hop attack will remain undetected.
Scenario 2: Stateful centralized Firewall If the SDN con-
troller decides to inspect every single packet, all the network
connection traffic will be redirected to SDN controller, as
shown in Figure 2. The SDN controller may be quickly
overwhelmed. Additionally, the attacker can launch control
plane saturation attacks if the connection tracking is enforced
on the SDN controller, as highlighted by AVANTGUARD [13].
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND DATA FLOW
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Fig. 3. SDFW Architecture
The SDFW architecture in Figure 3 is primarily divided into
three planes, i.e., application plane, responsible for user-
interface, through which the user can enter higher-level secu-
rity policies, and visualize the state of a distributed firewall.
The control plane consists of modules, responsible for the
translation of higher level security policies, into OpenFlow
rules, and identifying any conflicts between OpenFlow rules,
and security policies. The data plane consists of OpenFlow
switches, with state-tracking capability, each OpenFlow switch
acts as a firewall module for inspecting traffic between the
hosts connected to the switch, and the traffic between switch
and control plane.
SDFW Manager: checks the status of individual virtual fire-
walls connected through Network Information Base as shown
below, and accepts the security policies through the UI written
in the PHP-lavarel framework.
Network Information Base (NIB): acts as a middleware
between the application plane implementing distributed firewall
policy and local event listeners on each switch. NIB notifies
the local-agents on each switch about any new application se-
curity policies and maintains synchronization between different
agents. NIB has been implemented using Zookeeper [14].
Policy-Graph-Creator: checks the dependencies between re-
quirements of different security policies, and creates end-to-end
conflict-free Policy-Graph to direct traffic between different
hosts in a data-center. The control plane utilizes this Policy-
Graph to modify the flow rules of OpenFlow tables, using
OpenFlow message ofp flow mod() and creates an end-to-
end traffic flow. This module checks the dependencies between
requirements of different policies. The end result of this process
is Policy-Graph.
Traffic Statistics: The controller consists of
TopoChangeEventListener, which listens on the events such
as port status (UP/DOWN), switch status, port information of
hosts connected to switches. If there is any topology change,
the event listener utilizes a PUSH notification to notify the
application plane, which in-turn updates the visualization and
traffic statistics.
IV. DESIGN OF STATEFUL DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL
The most popular software switch used by OpenFlow protocol
Open vSwitch has a capability to track the connection-state of
the packet, as well as the features to define the virtual routing
domains in the Linux kernel. Some important fields, of the
conntrack module, which we will use in the illustrative example
have been defined in the Table I below.
In our distributed firewall design, we leverage the information
stored by the OpenFlow table and connection tracking table
to identify security violations. We use a Local DFW Event-
Listener, which keeps track of all the stateful connection events,
that happen on the conntrack module. The event listener can
inspect if the activities are malicious or benign, and take
corresponding countermeasures to mitigate the security threats.
The Figure 4, shows the stepwise handling of security incidents
such as TCP SYN-Flood attack. Consider the attacker located
on the source IP address 10.0.0.1, sends traffic to the victim
on the destination IP address 10.0.0.2, port 80 - Step (1).
TABLE I
OVS CONNTRACK FIELDS
Field Description
ct state State of the connection tracking module, +/- is
used for specifying set, unset. Examples - +new,
+esttablished, +trk.
ct zone independent connection tracking context, set by
action.
ct nw src,
ct nw dst
Source and destination IP of connection.
ct tp src,
ct tp dst
Source and destination port of connection.
commit Commit the connection to the connection track-
ing module.
OpenFlow Table
(1) Packet-In
Conntrack Module
(2) conntrack()
CT Table
Local DFW-
Event-Listener
(3) Create & Update
conntrack()
(4) conntrack
-event()
(4) Connection State 
(conn_state=)
(5) Modify Flow Table (flow_mod)
Match Action Stats
in_port(1), ct_nw_src=10.0.0.1, ct_nw_dst=10.0.0.2, 
ct_tp_src=80,tcp,ct_state=+trk
actions=ct(table=0) n_packets=200
in_port(1), ct_nw_src=10.0.0.1, 
ct_nw_dst=10.0.0.2,ct_tp_src=80,ct_state=+trk,+new 
actions=ct(commit) n_packets=3
in_port(1), ct_nw_src=10.0.0.1, 
ct_nw_dst=10.0.0.2,ct_tp_src=80,ct_state=+trk,+new
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3
Fig. 4. Local State Tracking and Security Analysis, TCP SYN-Flood Attack
mitigation.
f o r i i n r ang ( 0 , 1 9 9 ) :
sendp ( E t h e r ( ) / IP ( s r c = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ” , d s t = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ” ) /
TCP( s p o r t =1024 ,
d p o r t =80 , f l a g s =0x02 , seq =100+ i ) , i f a c e =”1”)
The OpenFlow Table sends the packet to Conntrack Module -
Step (2). The conntrack module, is responsible for creating
and updating connection tracking table - CT Table - Step
(1). The rule with ID ’1’, is used by CT table to assign a
state=+trk to the new connection, corresponding to the SYN
packet (syn=100). Additionally, the OpenFlow module, sends
back the SYN-ACK - rule ID ’2’, to notify the attacker, about
the intent for establishing the TCP connection, using response
(syn=100,ack=200).
The attacker, however, instead of sending ACK=201 corre-
sponding to the (syn=100,ack=200), sends a huge volume of
networking traffic as shown using sendp() command above.
These half-open connections, saturate the network bandwidth
of victim ’10.0.0.2’.
Local DFW-Event-Listener also receives the event-
notification about the connection state from the CT Table.
The module, checks the difference in the Stats column for the
rules with ID ’1’, and, ’2’ (syn=100 to syn=300), in the figure
above, and the absence of ACK from the attacker, which is
necessary to establish the TCP full connection, and inserts a
rule in OpenFlow Table - Step 5, to drop the communication
from attacker corresponding to the half-open connections -
rule ID ’3’.
A. SDN Managed Container Environment: Case Study
The Linux Containers [15] have gained popularity in recent
times, since they allow quick provisioning of applications,
and are easy to manage using the lxc daemon. We created
an environment, with about 100 Linux containers of type
Ubuntu:16.04 and CentOS 6, which downloads the lxc images
for OS, creates the containers and assigns the IP address to
containers.
i m p o r t l x c
i m p o r t s y s
i m p o r t os
d e f c r e a t e C o n t a i n e r s ( ) :
f o r i i n r a n g e ( 1 , 1 0 0 ) :
os . sys tem ( ’ lxc−c r e a t e − t download −n u ’+ s t r ( i ) + −−
d i s t
ubun tu −−r e l e a s e b i o n i c −−a r c h amd64 ’ )
os . sys tem ( ’ sudo lxc−s t a r t −−name u ’+ s t r ( i ) + ’ −−
daemon ’ )
d e f setVMIP ( ) :
f o r i i n r a n g e ( 1 , 1 0 0 ) :
os . sys tem ( ’ lxc−a t t a c h −n u ’+ s t r ( i )+’−− bash −c \ ’
sudo
i p add r add 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 ’ + s t r ( i ) + ’ /24 dev e t h 0 \ ’ ’ )
os . sys tem ( ’ lxc−a t t a c h −n u ’+ s t r ( i )+’−− bash −c \ ’
sudo
i p r o u t e add d e f a u l t v i a 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 \ ’ ’ )
d e f p r i n t C o n t a i n e r s ( ) :
f o r c o n t a i n e r i n l x c . l i s t c o n t a i n e r s ( a s o b j e c t =True
) :
p r i n t ( c o n t a i n e r . name , c o n t a i n e r . s t a t e , c o n t a i n e r .
g e t i p s ( ) ,
c o n t a i n e r . g e t c g r o u p i t e m ( ” memory .
m a x u s a g e i n b y t e s ” ) )
c r e a t e C o n t a i n e r s ( )
setVMIP ( )
p r i n t C o n t a i n e r s ( )
We modified the configuration files of each container to attach
the containers’ port to the Linux bridge ’br100’, which we used
for the analysis of the target environment as shown below. The
’ovsup’ and ’ovsdown’ scripts were utilized for attaching and
detaching the containers to ovs-bridge when the container is
started or stopped. The default configuration option linking the
containers to Linux bridge is commented out.
==============================
$ c a t \ v a r \ l i b \ l x c \u1\ c o n f i g
# D i s t r i b u t i o n c o n f i g u r a t i o n
l x c . i n c l u d e = / u s r / s h a r e / l x c / c o n f i g / ubun tu . common .
con f
l x c . a r c h = l i n u x 6 4
# C o n t a i n e r s p e c i f i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n
l x c . r o o t f s = / v a r / l i b / l x c / u1 / r o o t f s
l x c . r o o t f s . backend = d i r
l x c . u tsname = ux (1−100)
# Network c o n f i g u r a t i o n
l x c . ne twork . t y p e = v e t h
# l x c . ne twork . l i n k = l x c b r 0
l x c . ne twork . s c r i p t . up = / e t c / l x c / ovsup
l x c . ne twork . s c r i p t . down = / e t c / l x c / ovsdown
============ ovsup =============
# ! / b i n / bash
BRIDGE=” br100 ”
ovs−v s c t l −−may−e x i s t add−br $BRIDGE
i f c o n f i g $5 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 up
ovs−v s c t l −−i f−e x i s t s de l−p o r t $BRIDGE $5
ovs−v s c t l −−may−e x i s t add−p o r t $BRIDGE $5
===========ovsdown===========
# ! / b i n / bash
BRIDGE=” br100 ”
i fdown $5
ovs−v s c t l de l−p o r t br100 $5
===============================
Each OpenFlow switch runs a Local DFW-Event-Listener, a
python module, which keeps track of events related to stateful
connections. For instance, we used TCP SYN-Flood.py mod-
ule, which simulates SYN-Flood attack on the container with
u2 - IP (10.0.3.102) to try and send a huge volume of traffic
to container u3 - IP (10.0.3.103). With the connection tracking
in place, we check the OpenFlow rules, present on the OVS-
bridge br100 connecting both hosts.
( 1 ) c o o k i e =0x0 , d u r a t i o n =355.095 s , t a b l e =0 ,
n p a c k e t s =1400 , n b y t e s =75600 ,
nw src = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 2 , nw dst = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 3 , r e s e t c o u n t s
p r i o r i t y =50 , c t s t a t e =− t r k ,
t cp , i n p o r t =vethNNE99K a c t i o n s = c t ( t a b l e =0)
( 2 ) c o o k i e =0x0 , d u r a t i o n =492.169 s , t a b l e =0 ,
n p a c k e t s =1400 , n b y t e s =75600 ,
nw src = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 2 , nw dst = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 3 , r e s e t c o u n t s
p r i o r i t y =50 , c t s t a t e =+new ,
tcp , i n p o r t =vethNNE99K a c t i o n s = c t ( commit ) , o u t p u t :
vethMFMXS7
( 3 ) c o o k i e =0x0 , d u r a t i o n =72.178 s , t a b l e =0 ,
n p a c k e t s =0 , n b y t e s =0 ,
nw src = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 2 , nw dst = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 3 , r e s e t c o u n t s
p r i o r i t y =50 ,
c t s t a t e =+ e s t , t cp , i n p o r t =vethNNE99K a c t i o n s = o u t p u t
: vethMFMXS7
Based on the observation of flow rules, we can see that the
attacker, only sends only SYN-packets, ct state = +new -
rule (2) in the output above, the field n packets = 1400
indicates a huge volume of TCP traffic directed towards the
victim. The host 10.0.3.103, sends SYN-ACK, but the attacker,
doesn’t send back ’ACK’, which can lead to state-transition,
i.e., ct state = +est, thus leading to full TCP connection. We
can observe that the OpenFlow rule (3) has n packets = 0.
Flow(ct state = +new, n packets = 1400)
Flow(ct state = +est, n packets = 0)
≥ δ (1)
The SDFW Local DFW-Event-Listener, realizes that the thresh-
old set for DDoS detection δ has been exceeded as shown
above, and installs a new Flow rule with higher priority than
the existing rule which allows TCP SYN packets, as shown
below.
ovs−o f c t l add−f low br100 \
” t a b l e =0 , p r i o r i t y =51 , nw src = 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 2 , nw dst
= 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 0 3 , t c p a c t i o n s = drop ”
The malicious devices can also send a connection request to
the switching software in the data plane. If the switch consists
of flow rule entry corresponding to the traffic pattern, traffic
is forwarded out of the specific switch port. If the entry is
missing (table-miss packets) the request is sent to the controller.
A class of DoS attacks - data to control plane saturation attacks
as discussed by Gao et al [10] can forge the OpenFlow fields
with random values, that will lead to table-miss event in the
switch. When a large volume of forged table-miss flows is sent
to the controller as packet in entries. The controller can be
saturated since these packet in messages will consume a large
amount of switch-controller bandwidth and controller resources
(CPU, memory). SDFW helps in the detection and mitigation
of such attacks using state-based traffic analytics as discussed
in the case study above.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We utilized an OpenStack based cloud network comprising
of two Dell R620 servers and two Dell R710 servers all hosted
in the data center. Each Dell server has about 128 GB of RAM
and 16 core CPU. The SDN controller Opendaylight-Carbon
was provided network management and orchestration in our
framework.
TABLE II
SDFW COMPONENTS USED IN IMPLEMENTATION
Component LOC/Version Language / Frame-
work
SDN Controller OpenDaylight
Carbon
Java, REST APIs
Local DFW-
Event-Listener
500 python
Policy-Graph 500 python with Flask
APIs
Flow Conflict
Analyzer
700 python, networkx
Flow-Visualizer 250 python, d3, REST
APIs
Data-Plane 200 Linux container
LXC-3.0
Frontend/UI 400 php-lavarel
In addition to these components - Table II, we used the latest
version of Open vSwitch (OVS 2.9.0), with conntrack module
enabled to support the data plane connection tracking.
B. SDFW Scalability Analysis
We conducted a scalability analysis to check the performance
of SDFW when handling the TCP-SYN Flood attack. We
conducted two separate experiments, one on a single switch
topology, and one on a tree topology.
H1
10.0.3.1
H2
10.0.3.2
H100
10.0.3.100
br1
H1
10.0.3.1
H8
10.0.3.8
br2
H57
10.0.3.57
H64
10.0.3.64
br9
br1
(a) Single Switch Flat Topology
Number of hosts = 100, Switches = 1
(b) Tree Topology, Depth=2, Fanout=8
Number of hosts = 64, Switches = 9
Fig. 5. SDFW Scalability Analysis Experiment
Flat Topology: We utilized python script to run DDoS script
from host H1 - 10.0.3.1 to perform TCP SYN-Flood on host
H100 (10.0.3.100) - Figure 5(a). The experimental results show
that once attack pattern is detected by SDFW, the attack-
mitigation is enforced using OpenFlow rule on corresponding
OpenFlow switch. We have currently utilized countermeasure
to ’DROP’ traffic flows for malicious traffic pattern, however
other possible countermeasures include ’Rate-Limiting’ the
traffic flow, or redirecting to a honeypot for performing fine-
grained packet analysis.
TABLE III
SDFW SCALABILITY DDOS PROTECTION - FLAT TOPOLOGY
Hosts BW-No-
SDFW
(Gb/s)
BW-
SDFW
(Gb/s)
Latency-
No-SDFW
(ms)
Latency-
SDFW
(ms)
100 42.96 37.6 8.76 9.66
The experimental results - Table III show that there is an 11%
drop in the network bandwidth - from when using SDFW, and
9% increase in the latency, i.e., from 8.76 ms to 9.66 ms when
utilizing SDFW to inspect the connection state of network
hosts. The drop in performance can be attributed to the fact
that a single switch is receiving requests from about 100 hosts,
and connection state of each host is analyzed using connection
tracking module.
Tree Topology: The benefit of distributed firewall can be
realized in a network having multiple switches, where each
switch can locally track events from the hosts connected
directly. We created a tree topology, with depth=2, fanout=8
in second experiment - Figure 5(b).
TABLE IV
SDFW SCALABILITY DDOS PROTECTION - TREE TOPOLOGY
Hosts BW-No-
SDFW
(Gb/s)
BW-
SDFW
(Gb/s)
Latency-
No-SDFW
(ms)
Latency-
SDFW
(ms)
64 35.9 35.3 8.87 9.2
The experiment results - Table IV, show that in a network,
with each switch checking attack-pattern for DDoS locally,
then we have limited drop in performance. The bandwidth is
reduced from 35.9 Gb/s to 35.4 Gb/s ∼ 1.6% drop, which
is acceptable for a moderate size network. Similarly, the
network latency increases from 8.87 ms to 9.2 ms, when using
SDFW for detecting the SYN-Flood attack, a ∼ 3.5% increase.
This gain in performance can be attributed to the fact, that
benefit of distributed firewall implementation is obtained when
multiple switches are involved. The experiments prove, that,
in comparison to a centralized firewall model, the distributed
stateful-firewall is able to scale well on a large network.
VI. RELATED WORK
Distributed Stateful-SDN Security is required to deal
with attacks originating in SDN data-pane, as discussed by
Bosshart et al [16]. The most relevant work to ours is what
Openstate [17] extended the OpenFlow switch to define a state-
transition variable and extended finite-state-machine (XFSM)
table, which is able to handle scenarios such as port knock-
ing and TCP SYN-ACK message verification. The design is
however based on centralized firewall architecture. The SDFW
presented in this paper captures the recommendations defined
in NIST 800-125b [18] for protecting workloads within the
data-center using next-generation distributed firewall (NDFW)
model. Onix [19] uses distributed control plane design for
SDN environment. We have used similar design principles for
SDFW such as distributed virtual switch and network infor-
mation base (NIB). P4 [20] is programming language which
allows, protocol independent packet processing, and stateful
packet inspection. We plan to extend the current work and
develop a programming platform based on distributed firewall
architecture.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we address the issue of security issues associated
with lateral movement of attacker along the east-west plane in
a data center, and packet flooding based data plane attacks. One
limitation of this work is that we utilize SDFW to showcase
defense against layer 4 security attacks. However, a next-
generation firewall can also act as an application firewall and
Deep-Packet-Inspection (DPI) module. As a part of future
work, we plan to extend SDFW and address security attacks at
the application layer.
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